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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PARLEY MARSH,
-vs.-

Plaintiff (J;rtd Respondent,

ROBERT BRYCE IRVINE,

Defendant and Appellant,

JA~IES

Case
No.11255

BLACKWOOD NEIL,

Def enda.nt and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff Marsh to recover
damages for injuries arising out of the automobile accident, against two defendants, one of whom, Irvine, was
the driver of the vehicle in which Marsh was riding and
the other, Neil, the driver of the vehicle which struck the
rear of the Irvine vehicle in which plaintiff was riding.
Irvine also filed a cross-claim against the other defendant, Neil, for damage to the Irvine vehicle. (After this
brirf was prepared Neil settled with Irvine for Irvine's
damages and the cross-claim has been dismissed.)
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The ease was tried before a. jury which returned a
verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant Irvine for
$10,000.00 and a no cause verdict in favor of the de- '
fendant Neil on both the complaint and the cross-claim.
The trial court subsequently denied defendant Irvine's
motion for a. new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court; that the Supreme Court enter a judgment
for the defendant Irvine as a matter of law on the plaintiff's complaint and in the alternative for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The collision out of which the plaintiff's cause of
action arose occurred on the 9th day of November, 1964,
at about 4 :20 p.m. on State Road 201 which is the main
highway going past the Magna. Mill and Arthur Smelter.
(See Exhibit 3-P).
The plaintiff Marsh and defendant Irvine both
worked at the Arthur Concentrate Plant. Marsh, together with Russell Beck and Bud Turpin rode back and
forth to work from Salt Lake City with Irvine in his
1962 Ford station wagon on about a daily basis paying
-:\lr. Irvine $.75 per day for the ride (R. 345).
State Highway 201 in the area where the accident
occurred is a four-lane hard surface highway running
2
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o-euernlly• east and west with the inside eastbound lane
being l 4 feet 6 inches wide and the outside lane 13 feet
wide. There is also an 8-f oot hard surface shoulder used
for emergency stopping on the south side of the highway
(R. 222). The east and westbound lanes of traffic are
separated by a raised island (R. 223) which has a break
in it at the junction with the Magna Mill Road. (See
Exhibits 2-P and 3-P). The Magna Mill Road joins
from the south. A stop sign faces traffic going from the
l\Iagna Mill Road onto Highway 201 (Exhibits 3-P, 6,
7, 8 and 9-P). The stop sign is 12 feet south of the
south edge of Highway 201 and 6 feet east of the east
edge of the Magna Road. Officer Hayward, the investigating officer from the Utah Highway Patrol, described
the highway as a fairly new asphalt base with oil and
rock chip surface (R. 281) and probably travel worn
(R. 222) or traffic worn (R. 281). The highway was
fairly level in the area where the accident occurred
(R. 277, Exhibits 6, 7, 8 and 9-P).

tl .

Officer Hayward testified that using an average drag
factor for that highway, reaction time, plus stopping distance at 60 miles per hour on that highway was 250 feet,
ancl other speeds as follows:
50 miles
45 miles
40 miles
35 miles
:~o miles

per hour per hour per hour per hour per hour (R. 282)

178 feet
154 feet.
126 feet
102 feet.
79 feet.
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Visibility is good for several hundred feet both to
the east and west from the Magna Road along Highway
201 (R. 277).
.
When he arrived, he noted the Neil and Irvine vehicles both in the inside lane of traffic where they came
to rest after the accident (R. 224). The vehicles were
several feet apart, and .Mr. Irvine's vehicle was 77 feet
east of the west end of two brake marks in the inside
lane of traffic which were each 7 feet long and began 140
feet from the exit of the Magna Mill Road. These marks
were left by the Neil vehicle and were the only marks
left by the vehicle (R. 231, 232).
At the time of the accident the road was dry, it was
daylight and the road was clean (R. 234-235, 237).
The officer thought the point of impact to be in the
inside lane of traffic in the area of the two brake marks
but excluded the possibility of the impact being to the
·west of the marks (R. 232-233, 288).
On cross-examination the officer said he couldn't say
whether the impact was beyond the skid marks or at the
skid marks (R. 288-289). No other evidence was given
by the officer as to where the impact took place (R. 289).
The officer checked the area west of the seven-foot skid
mark for a distance of 200 to 300 feet and found no other
marks (R. 297). Damage to defendant Neil's vehicle
on the front end was $75.00; damage to defendant
Irvine's vehicle on the left rear was very slight (R. 297,
301, 370).
4
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Mr. Irvine, with Mr. Marsh in the front seat of the
car, stopped at the stop sign at the Mill Road entrance
to the main highway and picked up Mr. Beck and Mr.
Turpin. He stopped about five feet west of the east edge
of the Magna Mill Road and at about the stop sign (R.
351) with the front end about five feet south of Highway
201 ( R. 366). He then looked to the west for approaching traffic. He observed traffic about 500 feet to the west
of the intersection (R. 354) in both lanes of traffic (R.
3f55) with traffic in the inside lane being a little further
away (R. 367). Mr. Beck, in the back seat, said, "It is
clear; let's go.'' Irvine entered into the intersection
and drove across the outside lane and into the inside lane
as indicated on Exhibit P in red (R. 359). He placed
the point of impact at a distance approximately 230 feet
east of the east edge of the Magna Road entrance in the
inside lane of traffic (R. 359) as shown in red. He was
traveling at between 30 to 35 miles per hour when his
1·ehicle was struck from the rear by the Neil vehicle
(R. 360-361). In entering the intersection he drove in a
normal manner and did not accelerate rapidly. When
he left the stop sign, he did not proceed down the righthand lane and then swing over to the inside lane (R. 362363) but made a normal curve pattern into the inside
lane ( R. 367). He estimated he was going 15 miles per
hour as he entered the inside lane of traffic (R. 234).
After observing the traffic west of the intersection and
entering the intersection he did not again look to the
west, and he did not see the Neil vehicle until after impact (R. 444, 445).

5
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The defendant, Mr. Neil, was on his way from Too.
ele to Sandy. He had been to Tooele in connection with
his plumbing business and was driving a 1964 Chevrolet
Greenbrier van-type vehicle. He had been over this road
many times and was aware that there was a change of
shift taking place at the mills as he was driving along the
highway (R. 477) and was also aware of the congested
traffic condition. He was traveling at a speed of 60
miles per hour which was the posted limit. When he
first saw the defendant Irvine's vehicle, it was stopped at
the stop sign, and Mr. Neil testified he was then 150 feet
away traveling at 60 miles per hour (R. 454, 464). He ,
observed Irvine move out into the intersection. He disagreed with Mr. Irvine's drawing as to the path the
Irvine vehicle took from the stop sign and claimed that
it went directly north until it entered his lane of traffic
(R. 456; also see the green line drawn on Exhibit 3-P by
Mr. Neil representing the path of Irvine's vehicle). He
also placed the point of impact where the two short green
lines appear east of the intersection 180 feet (R. 457, 467).
The Irvine vehicle moved uninterruptedly into the intersection, and it wasn't fast (R. 458). Neil testified that
Irvine was going about 20 miles per hour when he crossed
into his lane of traffic and that he was going 30 to 33
miles per hour at impact ( R. 458). The direction of tra\'el of the Irvine vehicle caused Neil some alarm as he
saw it coming toward his lane of traffic (R. 458).
When Neil first saw the Irvine vehicle moving out
into the intersection, he applied his brakes but his vehicle swayed and almost went out of control. He then
6
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rrleased the brake and let the engine take over the vehicle
again and then he jammed on the brakes again to stop
it, but the impact was definitely not where the skid marks
i\'erc but further east (R. 459). He thought he was going
around 30 miles per hour at the time of impact with the
Inine vehicle (R. 459). Neil testified that Irvine should
haw gotten up as much speed as he possibly could when
he got in his lane, but instead got in the fast lane and
loafed along (R. 460, 488) or drove in a normal manner (R. 477).
When Irvine entered Neil's lane of traffic, Neil was
13 to 100 feet back from the stop sign and still going 60
milrs per hour. He said it was doubtful that he could
haYe stopped before he got to the point of impact if he
had kept his brakes on when he first applied them (R.
481) but admitted he could have slowed the vehicle to
less than 30 miles per hour (R. 481).
Captain Ed Pitcher of the Utah Highway Patrol was
called as an expert witness. He testified that he has had
28 years of experience with the Utah Highway Patrol
and has investigated thousands of accidents, has had
many yea rs of training and has also trained police officers in Utah in accident investigation for many years.
Captain Pitcher testified that on a good asphalt road,
which \\'as dry and free from debris, where the temperature was not unusual and the road was level, the probable stopping distance of an ordinary car with good tires
including reaction time and based on an average drag
factor of .65 would be as follows:

7
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60 miles per hour - 251 feet
(R. 509) 66 feet reaction time.
55 miles per hour - 215 feet
50 miles per hour -182 feet
45 miles per hour - 153 feet
40 miles per hour - 128 feet
35 miles per hour - 101 feet
30 miles per hour - 79 feet
and that the average reaction time is three-fourths of one
second. Captain Pitcher measured the distance on the
scaled drawing on the line of travel as given by Mr. Neil
for the Irvine vehicle from the stop sign to the inside
lane of eastbound traffic as 33 feet and the distance from
the point where Mr. Neil placed the point of impact to
where he entered the inside lane of traffic as 180 feet from
the scaled drawing. Using these factors and on the basis
of a hypothetical question from plaintiff's counsel which
assumed that the Irvine vehicle traveled from a stopped
position at the stop sign to a speed of 35 miles per hour
at the point of impact as testified to by witnesses, there
being a total distance of 213 feet from the stop sign to
the point of impact, Captain Pitcher computed it would
take a total of 8.4 seconds.
From the point where Irvine entered the inside lane
of traffic to the point of impact would take 5.1 seconds.
He also computed on the basis of his experience and
the hypothetical question that Irvine would enter the
inside lane at a speed of 13.7 miles per hour (R. 510).
He also testified that a car could not accelerate to a speed
of 35 miles per hour in a distance of 32 feet; that that
is about three times the expected maximum acceleration
of the ordinary car, (R. 565, 566) and that he couIJ no!
8
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make the turn at that speed. On the basis of the same
drag factor, Pitcher testified that Neil would slow from
60 miles per hour to 35 miles per hour in a distance of 122
feet (R. 511, 519) and that it would take 1.7 seconds to
slow from 60 down to 35 leaving a balance in time of 3.4
seconds reserve time (R. 517, 520). The Neil car at that
point if brakes were applied would h€ 423 feet west of
the point of impact. At 60 miles per hour he could have
brought his vehicle to a complete stop in 4.2 seconds after
the brakes were applied (R. 517). With 5.1 seconds available to Neil after Irvine entered the inside lane and
including three-fourths of a second reaction time Neil
could have come to a complete stop before the point of
impact with .15 seconds to spare. [Mr. Neil claimed that
he had faster than average reaction time which he said
was five seconds. His was three seconds (R. 478, 479).]
To slow to 30 miles per hour from 60 with a drag factor
of .65 would take 139 feet.
Captain Pitcher also testified that he supervised
11ome tests in the area of the accident on June 27, 1965,
about seYen months after this accident (R. 539). The
tests ·were taken in between the two flumes shown in Exhibit 8-P (R. 540). The drag factor or co-efficient of
friction determined by those tests were .79 and .80 (R.
544). He also testified that he was acquainted with the
road, that it was a high-type road with a good surface
on it, that his tests were made when the road was dry
and clear of foreign material and that the surface where
he made his tests appeared to be similar to the road
\\'ere the accident occurred. He checked it again the
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night before testifying ( R. 542-544). :Mr. Irvine testifie<l
the road surface had not bee11 changed since the accide 11 t
(R. 653).
With a drag factor of .79 it would take 114 feet to
slow from 60 miles per hour to 30 according to Captain
Pitcher ( R. 572).
During the beginning phase of the case while Officer
Hayward was testifying the court in chambers advised
all counsel that it would not allow testimony of Officer
Hayward \vi th respect to the co-efficient of friction of the
highway (R. 269) but that after the witness qualified
as an expert through experience and training that he
could testify relative to the approximate stopping distances ( R. 269). The officer was thereafter permitted to
testify from his Utah Highway Patrol chart on stopping
distances using what he considered was an average drag
factor for the highway in question as previously described by him (R. 282-285).
Subsequently, when Captain Ed Pitcher testified as
an expert witness, the stopping distances were again
brought out on the basis of an average drag factor for
the highway as described by Officer Hayward (R. 294496).
On Voir Dire Examination by Mr. Hanson Captain
Pitcher, who had been in court during Officer Hayward's
testimony and was aware of the court's ruling with r~
spect to using the term "co-efficient of friction," testified that he was using an average drag factor for good
10
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roa(ls, good tires and so on, but the court finally allowed
~Ir. Hanson to bring out he was using a factor of .65
(R. 4-9:5).
On cross-examination he was allowed to bring out
from Captain Pitcher that the chart used by Officer Hay11·a nl s!JOvYecl a co-efficient of friction of .45 to .65 for a
t rnffic polished road on speeds over 30 miles per hour and
to elicit from him the various stopping distances at
speeds of 60 to 30 miles per hour using those drag factors. (H. 520-524, 552-553) Captain Pitcher did not agree
\ritl1 tlie ehart and didn't agree that the numbers on the
cliart were proper numbers (R. 526).
The testimony on this interrogation follows:
rfHE CouRT: I want to make my point again;
this witness has not testified as to the quality of
that particular road.

).[ R. H uN'r: Correct.
THE CouRT: He says, according to the chart
he uses, a good asphalt road-travel-polishedn1 ries between .45 as a drag-factor and a .65 as a
drag-factor.

:JfR. H uNT: Who testified to

that~

CouRT: Captain Pitcher; he says he uses
this chart.
THE

A. No ; I just read the chart; he asked me
what it read. I read it to him. I didn't agree
t hos0 are the proper numbers.
THE

chart?

CouRT: You don't agree with your own

11
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A. That is just a suggestive chart and it 1·-.
'
~.
ac t ua 11 y a page from a textbook which is used,
but. may have value where there are no tests
available.
THE CouRT: That is something entirely different; I assumed it was your chart. You put it out.
You have the officers use it?
A. It is suggestive; where there are no tests
available, or any other information.
Mn. HANSON : Your HonorA. Might continue-I might explain why I use
.65 in dealing with these l\fa. HANSON: I think that is immaterial. We

do have a point here, where there is no specific
drag-factor available. Maybe, I will have to go
into this chart, with the Jury, tomorrow.
MR. HuNT: Your Honor, it was the Court that
suggested we got to avoid this type of thing, and,
now, goes into matters of coefficient of friction or
drag-factor, and I am sure we are into the confusion (Argument.)
THE CouRT: :!\Iy suggestion was, the use hy
plaintiff of his own witness of calling for an expression of coefficient of friction; I permitted
the testimony of Hayward to come in just as yon
requested it, and it is in the record. It is before
the Jury.
If Mr. Hanson wants to attempt to bewilder
the Jury with scientific terms, without an cxplana~
tion of what drag-factor and what coefficient ~!
frction means, it would seem to me you shouldn t
object to that.
(R. 526-527)

12
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Thr court admitted Captain Pitcher's testimony
with respect to the skid tests made by him but would only
admit tt>stimony of the slowing distance from 60 miles
per hour to 30 miles per hour using the test skid drag
factor, although counsel sought to introduce other speeds
suC'h as 35 miles per hour which had been testified to by
witm•ssrs (R. 571-573). He was allowed to compute over
ohjection the distances for stopping using a co-efficient
of friction of .45 and Neil's counsel wrote them down on
n chnrt for the jury (R. 575).
rrhe court refused to give defendant Irvine's requested Instruction No. 1 for a directed verdict but did
gin~ the following instructions which counsel for Irvine
ohjecte(l to (R. 665, 666):

#6 - The rules of evidence ordinarily do not
permit the opinion of a witness to be received as
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the
case of expert ·witnesses. A doctor, engineer, apJJraiser or mechanic who by education, study and
experience has become an expert in any art,
science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any matter in
which he is versed and which is material to the
case. You should consider such expert opinion
and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it.
Give the opinion the weight to which you deem it
entitled, whether it be great or slight, and you
may reject it, if in your judgment the reasons
given for it are unsound. (R 105) (emphasis ours)
#15 - You are instructed that it is the law
of this state that no person shall drive a vehicle
011 a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards
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then existing. The driver of every vehicle shall
consiste~t with these requirements, drive at ai;
appropriate reduced speed when special hazards
exist with respect to the traffic or by reason of
the width of the highway, weather, the fact that
one may be approaching an intersection or any
other actual or potential hazards then existing.
If you find from the evidence that either of the
defendants drove his vehicle at a greater speed
than was reasonable and prudent, considering
the actual and potential hazards then existing,
then, in that event, said driver was guilty of negligence. (R. 114)
#20 - The law requires t'iat no person shall
turn a vehicle upon a public highway unless and
until such movement can be made with reasonable
safety. This does not mean, however, that the
driver of a motor vehicle, before making a turn,
must know that there is no possibility of accident.
It means that before starting to turn a vehicle
and while making the turn, the driver of the
vehicle must use such precaution as would satisfy
a reasonably prudent person, acting under similar
circumstances, that the turn could be made safely.
(R. 119)
#21 - You are instructed that when the driver
of a vehicle intends to make a right-hand turn at
an intersection, both the approach for the right
turn and the right turn itself shall be made as '
close as practical to the right-hand edge of the
road or roadways, and that on a roadway whe:e
there are two or more lanes marked for traffic m
each direction the driver of the vehicle making
the right hand turn shall remain in the outside
lane and shall not thereafter change to the left
or inside lane until the driver has first ascertained
that such movement can be made with safety.
Should it appear from a preponderance of the

14
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evidence that a driver in making a right hand
turn failed to execute the turn in the manner
aforesaid, that driver would be guilty of negligence. (R. 120)
#22 - You are instructed that the laws of the
State of Utah provide that whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic a vehicle shall be driven
as nearly as practical entirely within a single
lane and shall not be moved from such lane until
the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. A finding from a
preponderance of the evidence that a driver in
driving his car failed to comply with the foreging
requirement would make that driver guilty of
negligence. (R. 121)
#23 - A person, who without negligence on
his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted
with peril arising from either the actual presence
or the appearance of imminent danger to himself
or others is not expected nor required to use the
same judgment and prudence that may be required
of him in calmer and more deliberate moments.
In such a situation, his duty is to exercise
only the degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances. If, at that moment, he
exercises such care, he does all the law requires
of him, even though in the light of after events, it
might appear that a different choice and manner
of action would have been better and safer.
(R. 122)
The court also refused to give defendant's requested
Instruction No. 17 as follows:
#17 - Even though one party involved in a collision may be negligent, nonetheless, if the opera-
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tor of the other vehicle actually sees or discover
the negligence, or in the exercise of due cars
shou~d ha"."e seen o:r ~iscovered the negligence, ii~
si:fficient time to avoid the accident with opportumty so to do, then you are instructed that it his
duty to do so, and if he fails to act to avoid the
accident with such opportunity, he is negligent.
If, therefore, you find from a preponderance of
the evidence in this case that the defendant, Rob.
ert B. Irvine, was negligent in pulling out into the
through highway from the stop sign, but you fur.
ther found from a preponderance of the evidence
in this case that the defendant, James B. Neil.
saw, or in the exercise of due care should have
seen, the automobile of the defendant Irvine entering the highway when Neil was a sufficient distance away to avoid the accident and he failed to
do so, his failure would constitute negligence upon
his part and if such negligence on the part of the
defendant Neil was a proximate cause of the accident, then your verdict must be against the defendant, James B. Neil. (R. 54)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT IRVINE'S REQUEST
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO CAUSE
OF ACTION AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF
MARSH ON HIS COMPLAINT AND IN FAVOR OF IRVINE AND AGAINST THE CROSS·
DEFENDANT NEIL ON IRVINE'S CROSS·
CLAIM. (THE CROSS-CLAIM HAS BEEN
PAID SINCE THE APPEAL WAS FILED.)
The defendant, Irvine, takes the position in this case
that the court should have granted a directed verdict in
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favor of the defendant, Irvine, because the evidence was
dear that Irvine had entered the intersection into the
inside lane and proceeded so far east thereon, to-wit:
180 feet, that his conduct in entering the intersection as
he Jid did not constitute negligence and certainly was not
a proximate cause of the accident, if there was any negligence on his part. The investigating officer testified that
Jw found two seven-foot skid marks commencing at a
distance 140 feet east of the east edge of the intersecting
}fagna Road in the inside lane of traffic. He also testified that in his opinion the impact occurred somewhere
in the area of the skid marks but he was unable to tell
1rl1ere hecause there was nothing but the skid marks from
1rhich he could pick up a point of impact. Every one
of tlw witnesses present at the time of the accident put
the point of impact beyond the two skid marks including
Mr. Neil whose vehicle apparently left the two skid marks
of 7 feet. According to Mr. Neil the point of impact
occurred at a distance of 180 feet east of the point where
}Ir. Irvine entered into the inside lane of traffic, and it
was his testimony that Mr. Irvine came directly out from
the point where he was stopped by the stop sign into the
inside lane of traffic as is indicated by the green line
shown on Exhibit 3-P which was made by Mr. Neil.
l\lr. Irvine, on the other hand, while indicating that he
did not cross into the inside lane as sharply as Mr. Neil
has indicated, did testify that the point of impact was further to the east than that shown by Mr. Neil. This is indic·ated on the diagram by two red marks, one of which is in
the imicle lane of traffic and the other in the outside lane,
hut both of ·which Mr. Irvine testified should have been
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placed in the inside lane of traffic. He placed the poiut
of impact about 190 feet east of the point where he said
he crossed over into the inside lane of traffic.
Captain Pitcher testified that it would take 3.1 seconds from the time the vehicle crossed into the inside
lane of traffic to travel the 180 feet to the point of impact.
At that point, Mr. Irvine, by the testimo11y of all witnesses, was traveling a.ta speed of 30 to 33 miles per hour and
was gradually accelerating. l\fr. X eil was tranling at a
speed of 60 miles per hour which was the admitted speed
limit. There was no evidence to the contrary concerning
this. When he first saw the defendant Irvine's vehicle,
it was stopped at the stop sign, and Mr. Neil said that
he was then 150 feet away traveling at 60 miles per hour.
All of the actual eye witnesses, including ~Ir. Neil, testified that Mr. Irvine proceeded out from the stop sign in a
normal manner without any undue acceleration. Captain Pitcher computed that the I1Tine vehicle on normal
acceleration would be going 13.7 miles per hour as it
entered the inside lane. :Mr. Irvine testified that he
thought he was going about 15 miles per hour as he entered the inside lane of eastbound traffic. There is little, if any, dispute, therefore about five important fact~
in this case: (1) that Mr. Neil was traveling at a speed
of 60 miles per hour as he approached the intersection;
(2) that he saw the Irvine vehicle at the stop sigu and
watched it continuously thereafter; (3) that .Mr. Irvine
was traveling at a speed of about 30 to 35 miles per
hour, at time of impact; ( 4) that .Mr. Irvine drove in a
normal manner with respect to the speed at which he
traveled from the stopped position at the stop sign to a
18
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poi11t approximately 180 feet east of where he entered
the iHsid<' lane of traffic and ( 5) that the point of impact
occurred approximately 180 feet east of where Mr. Irvine
entered the inside lane of traffic.

It would have been impossible for the accident to
ha Ye occurred in the manner it did if 2\iir. Neil was only
LiO feet away from Mr. Irvine at the time he first obsr1Ted the Irvine vehicle stopped at the stop sign. At
GO miles per hour Mr. Neil was covering 88 feet a second aud in two seconds would have covered 176 feet
which would have put him past the point where Mr.
lrYine entered into the inside lane of traffic before Irvine
got to it. By Captain Pitcher's calculations it would
take :'.\tr. Irvine 3.3 seconds to travel from a stopped position at the stop sign to the inside lane of traffic. During
that 3.3 seconds Mr. Neil at 60 miles per hour would
CO\'er a distance of 290 feet.
In addition thereto we
must take into consideration that Mr. Irvine traveled
approximately 5.1 seconds after getting into the inside
laue of traffic, part of which time Mr.Neil was undoubtedly also still traveling at a speed of 60 miles per hour or
88 feet per second. This computation was to the rear of
the I nine vehicle which was involved in the impact. Mr.
"X eil, therefore, had to be some 600 or 700 feet west of
the intersection at the time Mr. Irvine first started out
from the stop sign.
Captain Pitcher computed that it would take 1.7 secowls on the highway in question to slow from 60 miles
prr hour down to 35 using a drag factor of .65 and that
it would take him 122 feet to reduce his speed during that
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period of time from 60 miles per hour to 35 miles per
hour. He also testified that at the commencement of the
5.1 seconds the Neil vehicle would be back 423 feet from
the point where the collision took place (R. 517). Mr.
Neil, therefore, had three times the time he needed to
slow from 60 miles per hour to 30 or 35 miles per hour
to avoid running into the rear end of the Irvine vehicle.
There was no need for a sharp application of brakes
nor for Mr. Neil to run up on the Irvine vehicle applying
his brakes hard as he did at the last instant.
Using the correct co-efficient of friction of about .79
for the highway, the defendant, Neil, would have had
even more time to slow down or to stop. It would only
take 114 feet to slow from 60 miles per hour to 30 according to Captain Pitcher with the drag factor of .79.
l\Ir. Irvine was so far east of the intersection at the
time the impact occurred that neither the intersection
law nor the right turn law applied with the duties of the
drivers to each other but the law of preceding and following vehicles was applicable.
In the case of Nels on v. Molena (Wash. Jan. 1959),
334 P.2d 170, the defendant made a right turn onto an
arterial highway. The defendant then traveled a distance of between 60 feet and 100 feet before being struck
by the plaintiff who was proceeding in the same direction on the arterial highway. The plaintiff testified that
he was driving between 50 and 60 miles per hour. The
speed limit was 50 miles per hour. The question pre~u
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sentecl to the appellate court was whether or not an instrnction should have been given applicable to right-ofway at an intersection. The appellate court held that
the principles of law that applied and the instructions
1d1ich should have been given were those applicable to
follo,ring and preceding drivers and the statute relating
to an overtaking driver was applicable. This case is similar to the one now before this court but the defendant
I nine's case is even stronger in that he had traveled
approximately 180 feet after entering into the lane of
traffic in which the accident occurred and in which Mr.
Xeil was traveling. Therefore, the law on intersections
did not apply nor did the law on making a right turn
apply. Mr. Irvine had traveled so far into the lane
that neither of these fact situations were applicable to
the situation that existed at the time the impact occurred. In the case of Hollis E. Walker v. Levi G. Pef Prso11, 3 Ut.(2) 54, 278 P.2d 291, the defendant PetersoH was making a left turn at an intersection near Bear
River City and observed the plaintiff Walker's vehicle a
distance north coming the opposite direction which he estimated iu excess of 375 feet from the intersection where
he was making the turn. The left turning driver did not
'lee the other car nor look again until after he heard the
screech of brakes and a horn sound and then it was too
late to avoid a collision. The trial court found that both
parties were negligent but that the speed of the plaintiff's vehicle was not a proximate cause of the collision
and euterecl judgment for the plaintiff.
'rhe speed limit just north of the intersection was
GO miles per hour but a short distance before the inter21
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section and through it wa8 40 miles per hour. The plaintiff's car left 148 feet of skid marks up to the point of
impact. The court on appeal said under normal conditions the stopping distance on the surfaced highway after
brakes have been applied is 128 feet at 50 miles per hour
and 155 feet at 55 miles per hour. This was on the basis
of data published by the Utah Highway Patrol. So if
plaintiff had stopped in the 148 feet, it would appear that
he was traveling 50 to 55 miles per hour when he applier]
his brakes, but he did not stop in that distance. There
was evidence indicating a speed considerably in excess of
55 miles per hour. Based on the reaction time plus the
skid distance, the court concluded that the plaintiff must
have been 203 feet away when dauger was recognized and
that if he had been traveling at the lawful speed of 40
miles per hour, he would have stopped in 126 feet or ii
feet short of the point of impact; whereas, the speed at
which he was traveling rendered it impossible for him
to stop. Under such state of facts said the court, "We do
not see how reasonable minds could conclude other than
that plaintiff's excessive speed was a contributing cause
of the accident.''
In the case now before this court the evidence is
clear that \vhen :I\Ir. Irvine entered the inside lane of traffic, the defendant Neil was 400 to 500 feet away. All the
distance he needed to slow to 35 miles per hour with the
co-efficient of friction of .65 was 122 feet and if he had
slowed to a speed of 30 to 35 miles an hour, there would
have been no accident. It is clear, therefore, that his
failure to slow his vehicle was not only negligence bu1
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was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Irvine
th·o,·e approximately 200 feet in the Jane of traffic where
the accideut occurred with the rear of the vehicle being
180 feet from the point where entry was made into the
inside Jane of traffic, the point of impact having occurred
on tile rear of his vehicle 180 feet from the point where
(be vehicle entered the inside lane.
TH the case of Hefferma(n. v. Rosser (Pa., 1965), 419
Pa. 550, 215 A.2d 655, the plaintiff contended that he en!C'red the highway from the north directly opposite the
1~xit of a motel, traveled across two westbound lanes of
traffic and into the inside eastbound lane of traffic to proceed in an easterly direction and traveled some 140 to 150
fee( before he was struck in the rear by the defendant's
whicle which was also proceeding east in the inside lane
of traffic. The accident occurred at night, but the highway was well lighted.
According to the defendant's testimony, he was procercling at a speed of approximately 40 to 45 miles per
hour and saw the plaintiff's automobile when defendant's automobile was about a car length from it. He
claimed that the plaintiff came a.cross the highway from
the center of three exits from the motel whereas the
plaintiff claimed he came out of the highway from the
,,·esterly most exit from the motel.
A jury found both parties guilty of negligence but
on plaintiff's motion a new trial was granted. The trial
court assigned two reasons for granting the new trial
(a) That in submitting the issue of contributory negli-
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gence to the jury he was iri. error and (b) that the ver.
diet was against the weight of the evidence.
The Supreme Court in reYiewing the case stated that
the record indicated that certain facts were established
beyond question: ( 1) The impact or contact between
the two motor vehicles took place at a point on the inside
eastbound lane directly opposite the motel's middle
driveway; (2) The defendant's motor vehicle struck the
plaintiff's motor vehicle in the rear; (3) Immediate!>·
after the accident def endaut, a construction worker
whose shoes were muddy, told the investigating police
officer that due to the muddy condition of his shoes, his
foot had slipped off the brake; ( 4) Route 22 at the point
of the accident vms at the time of the accident and is
generally a very heavily traveled highway, and such
traffic generally travels at high speed; ( 5) The plaintiff
was thoroughly familiar with the highway having entered the highway from the motel many times previously
to the accident; ( 6) The defendant did not actually see
plaintiff's motor vehicle enter the highway from thC'
middle driveway.
The court said the crux of the appeal is whether
upon the basis of the instant record there was sufficient
evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff to justify the trial court in instructing the jury '
on that subject and to sustain a jury verdict based upon
the finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
The trial court concluded there was not such evidence.
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The court then said, as to the manner of the happening of the accident:
We have the oral testimony of both plaintiff
and defendant plus certain incontrovertible facts
established by the testimony. Plaintiff, fully
aware of the danger inherent in the heavy and
fast speeding traffic proceeding both westerly and
easterly on the highway, upon leaving the motel
endeavored to effect an entry upon the highway
which required passage over the two westbound
lanes and a left-turn into the inside eastbound
lane. To safely effect such an entry required
observation of both westbound and eastbound
traffic and the entry necessarily had to be made in
a hasty and expeditious manner. If believed,
plaintiff's testimony would indicate that he made
the necessary traffic observations, that he came
out fast on the highway, that he had successfully
negotiated the passage over the westbound lanes
and into the inside eastbound lane and that not
only was he in the latter lane when struck, but
he had proceeded in that lane for 140 to 150 feet
when the rear end collision took place. On the
other hand, the defendant testified that the accident occurred not after plaintiff had effected an
entry into the eastbound lane and after he had
proceeded therein 140 to 150 feet, but at the time
plaintiff was entering the eastbound lane.
Under plaintiff's version not only was he not
contributorily negligent but defendant was negligent in that he had full and adequate opportunity
to avoid a collision with plaintiff's vehicle. Under
d<:>f endant 's version because of the manner in
which plaintiff entered the eastbound lane defendant was afforded no opportunity to avoid the collision and plaintiff negligently effected an entry
into the path of defendant's eastbound vehicle.

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~l1he court, therefore, held that inasmuch as there
was a conflict in the evidence as to the point at which
the plaintiff's vehicle entered the eastbound lane, that is
whether at the point of impact or whether at the west
exit from the motel this became a jury question and
the trial court was not justified in granting a new trial.
The plaintiff's contention of the facts in this case is
quite in line with the undisputed facts in the lltarsh-lr1.:ine-N eil case and on the basis of the undisputed facts iu
this case with respect to where the impact occurred and
where Irvine entered the intersection, there would he
no negligence on Irvine's part and the sole proximate
cause of the accident would be the defendant Neil's negligence. The court, therefore, committed error in refusing to grant the defendant Irvine's request for a directed verdict.

It should be kept in mind that though the speed limit
along the area where the accident occurred is 60 miles
per hour under normal conditions, there was, in fact, at
the time the accident occurred a congestion of traffic. by
virtue of the change of shift at the Mills in the area along
which the highway ran, and the defendant, Neil, was well
aware of this fact. It is obvious that he continued to
clriYe at 60 miles ner
hour even after he saw the defend1
ant Irvine enter the highway and proceed into the inside
lane of traffic. Several cars had passed through the intersection while Irvine was waiting, and it was after a
break appeared in the traffic that he proceeded out into
the intersection. If he had to wait long enough that no
cars were required to even slow down upon his or an:·
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1

otlier cars' entrance into the highway, traffic would then
be unduly delayed on those streets intersecting with arterial highways.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT IRVINE'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
(A) THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY and
(B) THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR
IN ITS RULINGS ON THE EVIDENCE IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICER TO TESTIFY PERTAINNG TO
THE CO-EFFICIENT OF FRICTION OF THE
HIGHWAY WHERE THE ACCIDENT OC<~URRED BUT LATER ALLOWING CROSSEXAMINATION OF OFFICER ED PITCHER
vVITH RESPECT TO INAPPLICABLE CO:B~FFICIENTS OF FRICTION.
POINT II (A).
The court committed many errors in instructing the
jury which prevented the defendant Irvine from having
a fair and impartial trial. In Instruction No. 6 on expert witnesses the court by its instruction limited the
qualification of expert witnesses to a doctor, engineer,
appraiser or mechanic (italic ours).
In Instruction No. 15 the court gave a general instruction on speed so that it applied to both drivers.
Counsel for the parties in chambers had stipulated that
th(~ 11<-'fendant Irvine was not guilty of driving at an ex-
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cess1ve speed and, therefore, withdrew that ground of
negligence from the court. When the court submitted it
to the jurors with respect to both drivers, it could hare
no other tendency than to confuse them with respect to
the defendant Irvine's conduct. This was prejudicial
to the defendant Irvine.
Instruction No. 20 provided that no person should
turn a vehicle upon a public highway unless and until
such movement could be made with reasonable safety.
There is no evidence in this case that the defendant I nine
after he entered the inside lane of traffic made any turn
whatsoever from the lane in which he was traveling. It is
also clear that he drove directly from a position at the
stop sign over into the inside lane of traffic. This instruction, therefore, was inapplicable under the facts. Also the
instruction, if it were applicable, should read in the last
line thereof that the turn could be made with reasonable
safety.
Instruction 21 was also inapplicable because the
right turn was made and completed some 180 feet prior
to the point where the accident occurred. It was not the
proximate cause of the accident. Inasmuch as the defend·
ant Neil was far enough away that his vehicle was not a
hazard to the defendant Irvine's vehicle when Irvine
made his turn into the inside lane, the turn did not con·
stitute negligence. If it be classified as negligence, then
it certainly was not a proximate cause of the accident.
In the case of Meahler v. Doyle, (1922) 271 Pa. 492,
115 A. 797, it was held that although the act of the driyer
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of a motor truck in failing to keep to the right of the
center of an intersection in making a left turn might
under certain circumstances be negligence which would
render the driver liable, this conduct did not render him
liable for an injury to the rider of a bicycle who collided
with the truck, where the act did not occur as a result of
this act but happened after the truck had made the turn
and had traveled on a curve for about 67 feet, all of the
way in plain view of the rider of the bicycle, who had
ample room to avoid the truck. The case of Nelson v.
11folena, (Wash.) 334 P.2d 170, previously cited, is also
authority for the fact that the right turn law instruction
would not be applicable in this case. In the Nelson case
the court held that where the impact occurred 60 to 100
feet out of the intersection, the instruction on right-ofway should not have been given. In our case with the
impact occurring 180 feet approximately from where the
defendant entered into the inside lane of traffic, the failure to make a right turn into the right-hand lane and
then into the inside lane, if the law so requires, was no
longer an important fact with respect to the accident that
occurred. This instruction was certainly prejudicial to
the defendant Irvine.
In the case of McGregor v. Weinstein, et al., (Mont.)
225 P. 615, a statute provided that a driver must keep to
the right-hand curb while making his turn. The instruction in the case provided that the driver must keep close
to the right-hand curb and failure to do so constitutes
uegligence. The court held that the provisions of the
statute are elastic and do not attempt to lay down definite
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and rigid rules without reference to changing conditions
in the street and highways, their freedom from othe;
vehicles moving or stationary or fixed or permanent objects in the avenues of traffic or the position a person
operating a vehicle shall occupy to be free of negligence.
In Volume 2 of Blashfield Permanent Edition ~ 1084 it
is stated:
An ordinance requiring a vehicle to keep as close
as possible to the right curb is not to be taken
strictly, but is satisfied if the driver keeps as close
to such curb as is reasonably possible. The somewhat similar requirement that the vehicle keep as
close as practicable to the right-hand boundary
of the highway is an elastic one which does not
prescribe specific measurements or to lay down
rigid rules as to the distance which the vehicle
must keep from the curb. Instead it is a regulation which looks to the circumstances of the case
to give it color and meaning and convenience and
the condition of the street including its relative
freedom from all other vehicles or its more or
less crowded condition must all be taken into consideration in determining the position upon the
street which the vehicle must occupy in order that
the driver shall be free from negligence.
In other words, it is not negligence for a driver to
go into another lane of traffic other than the immediate
right one if there is no traffic close enough to constitute a
hazard to him if he does go into another lane. As stated
in the cases and the articles all of these circumstances
should be taken into consideration by the jury including
the question of oncoming traffic. The court's instructions do not allow the driver such elasticity.
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In both instructions Nos. 21 and 22 the court in'
strudcd the jury that the defendant Irvine was under a
duty not to change lanes until the driver had first ascertained that such movement could be made with safety
instead of using the term "with reasonable safety." Instructions Nos. 20 and 22 were also duplicitous and unduly emphasized the duty, if any, on the part of Mr.
Irvine with respect to turning from a lane of traffic or in
making a turn.

The court also committed error in giving Instruction
No. 23 on sudden emergency. The instruction on sudden
emergency is predicated upon the fact that the person
1rho is confronted with peril must not have been negligent himself in creating the peril. In Mr. Neil's case
the peril or emergency, if any, was created by his own
conduct which was very clear from the evidence. In
tlie case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Ut. 465, 214 P.
304, the accident occurred at nighttime when it was raining and the visibility was poor. The defendant did not
see the plaintiff until he was within six feet of him, when
he immediately applied his brakes, but was unable to stop
before striking the plaintiff. The court stated that they
were of the opinion as a matter of law under the facts
disclosed by the record that at the time of the injury and
immediately before defendant was not exercising reasonable and ordinary care in the operation of his car and
that if any emergency whatever existed, it was due entirely to his ovm negligence and, therefore, he was not
e11titled to an instruction on sudden emergency.
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In the case of Wright v. Sn.iffin, et al., (Cal. 1947),
181 P. 2d 675 in an action against a motorist for death
of a cyclist who attempted to pass the cyclist on the
wrong side of the highway within 100 feet of an inter.
section the court held that the motorist was not entitled
to an instruction on sudden emergency even though the
cyclist made a left turn in front of the motorist because
the motorist was guilty of negligence as a matter of law
in passing on the wrong side of the highway near the
intersection.
\Vhile the defendant Irvine was covering 180 feet,
he was using up over five seconds of time. At the time
he entered the lane, Mr. Neil was between 400 and 500
feet away. All the distance he needed to slow to 35 miles
per hour with a co-efficient of friction of .65 was 122
feet or 1.7 seconds of time. All he had to do was slow
down to 30 or 35 miles per hour, and there is no evidence
to the contrary.
The court erred, also, in failing to give defendant's
requested Instruction No. 17 which stated that even
though the defendant, Robert B. Irvine, may have been
negligent in pulling out into the through highway from
the stop sign, nevertheless, if the operator of the other
vehicle actually sees or discovers the negligence in suf·
ficient time to avoid the accident with opportunity so
to do, then it is his duty to do so, and if he fails to act or
avoid the accident with such opportunity, he is negligent.
In this case Mr. Neil saw Mr. Irvine's vehicle at the
stop sign, saw him pull into the intersection and watched
him all the while, and yet apparently did nothing to try
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to avoid the accident until he was almost at the point of
impact. It was very clear that Mr.Neil had a clear chance
to avoid the accident, but failed to do so and, therefore,
this instruction should have been given. See Jones v.
Kn1dsfn, 16 Ut. 2d 332, 400 P. 2d 562.
While the court's error in giving some of the instructions complained about and excepted to by appellant's counsel might be considered harmless, yet when
considered over all there is so much error the trial was
not a fair one as to the defendant Irvine and a new trial
should be granted.
POINT II(B)
'rhe court committed error in allowing Captain
Pitcher to testify over the objection of counsel during
cross-examination by Mr. Hanson (R. 520-527) of the
stopping distance of a vehicle on a highway having a
co-efficient of friction of .45. The chart used by Officer
Hayward was not in evidence (R. 140) and there was
no testimony or evidence that the highway had a low
c·o-efficient of friction such as .45.
The court refused to allow Officer Hayward to testify as to the co-efficient of friction of the highway (R.
243, 269). Captain Pitcher was required to testify as to
the stopping distances on .45 even though there was no
eYidence as to that co-efficient of friction and even though
lie <lisagreed with any such co-efficient of friction for
that highway (R. 526). The court refused to allow Offi('rr Hayward to use the co-efficient of friction because
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it would confuse the jury, but then improperly allowed
J\Ir. Hanson, counsel for Neil, to question Pitcher about
it even though it would confuse the jury. The court, in
fact, stated as follows (R. 527, line 20):
If Mr. Hanson wants to attempt to bewilder the
jury with scientific terms, without an explanation
of what drag-factor and what co-efficient of fric.
tion means, it would seem to me you shouldn't ob.
j ect to that.
Later Captain Pitcher testified that he had super.
vised tests made within a few hundred feet of the acci.
dent sceue a few months after the accident and deter.
mined an actual co-efficient of friction of .79 but the court
refused to allow Pitcher to testify as to stopping or slrm.
ing distances using the co-efficient of friction, except for
the slowing distance from 60 miles per hour to 30 miles
per hour of 114 feet (R. 572, 573). This was prejudicial
to defendant Irvine in that both officers' testimony "itb
respect to stopping distances was discredited.
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CONCLUSIONS
The trial court erred in failing to grant Irvine's request for a directed verdict and subsequently also committed error in failing to grant defendant Irvine's motion for a new trial. The appellant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law in his favor. In the event the
<'Ourt does not reverse the judgment, then appellant
should be granted a new trial with appropriate direction
to the trial judge with respect to instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
L. L. SUMMERHAYS of
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

.Attorneys for Defenda!riit
and .Appellant
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